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BANCROFT 
LIBRARY 

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THE  LIBRARY 

OF 

THE  UNIVERSITY 
OF  CALIFORNIA 


OUR  REPUBLIC 


A  lillill'S-m  VIBV  FOR  TOE  COXSIKATBW  OF 


MEN  OF  ALL  PARTIES 


BY 


JOHN  H.  STINSON,  Esg. 


'i:  FIF-TY  fI^>Tr 


SAN   FRANCISCO: 

M.  D.  CAEK  &  CO.,  PRINTEKS— 411  CLAY  STREET. 

L  8  6  3 . 


OF 


OUR   REPUBLIC 


A  BIRD'S-EYE  HEW  FOR  THE  CONSIDERATION  91 


MEN  OF  ALL  PARTIES, 


BY 


JOHN  H.  STINSON,  ESQ. 


SAN  FKANCISCO  : 

M.  D.  CARR  4;  CO.,  PRINTERS— 411  CLAY  STREET. 
1868. 


Entered  according  to  the  Act  of  Congress  in  the  year  1868, 

BY  JOHN  H.  STINSON,  ESQ., 

In  the  Clerk's  Office  of  the  United  States  District  Court,  in  and  for  thw 
District  of  California. 


Dangers  of  our  Republic. 


We  propose  in  this  little  pamphlet  to  explain,  in  several 
points,  the  philosophy  of  the  system  of  government  which 
our  fathers  framed  for  us,  and  also  to  show- how  its  essen- 
tial and  vital  provisions  may  be  evaded,  perverted  and 
destroyed.  And  the  manner  and  esteem  in  which  the 
provisions,  about  which  we  shall  speak  presently,  shall 
be  held  and  treated  by  the  American  people,  in  the  crises 
which  are  now  upon  us,  and  which  must  be  determined 
in  a  few  months,  so  far  as  to  give  direction  to  future 
events,  will,  in  our  opinion,  either  preserve  or  ruin  our 
whole  political  fabric. 

Every  Government  must  have  fundamental  principles 
upon  which  it  must  stand  or  fall.  And  when  these  funda- 
mental principles,  embodied  in  the  form  of  government, 
do  not  correspond  with  the  principles  upon  which  the  in- 
habitants of  the  country — who  can  influence  politics — act 
and  proceed,  the  government  is  already  virtually  sub- 
verted, and  in  a  short  time  anarchy  and  a  new  system  will 
follow. 

Two  sets  of  principles,  therefore,  must  be  investigated, 
viz  :  the  principles  of  the  Government  as  expressed  in  its 
Constitution,  if  it  have  one,  and  in  the  manner  of  making 
and  executing  its  laws  ;  and  also  the  principles  which  are 
impelling  those  who  can  give  direction  to  the  political 
events  of  the  country.  If  these  two  sets  of  principles  be 
in  harmony  with  each  other,  the  politics  of  the  country 
may  be  said  to  be  healthy,  and  the  Government  to  be 
stable ;  but  if  they  are  discordant,  serious  disorders  in 
the  body  politic  may  be  expected,  and  fatal  consequences 
may  follow. 


All  governments,  indeed,  must  necessarily  undergo 
modifications,  as  the  impelling  principles  of  society  con- 
flict with  the  constitution  and  laws.  But  there  are  certain 
limits  beyond  which  society  cannot  go,  and  no  further  modi- 
fications be  made  without  destroying  the  government 
itself. 

Bad  governments  have  been  modified  and  swept  away 
by  the  impelling  principles  of  society,  and  unfortunately 
good  governments  are  not  exempt  from  a  like  fate.  And 
if  we  would  reason  a  priori  respecting  events  before  us  in 
America,  we  must  look  to  these  two  sets  of  principles: 
Many  of  the  governmental  principles  with  us  have  been 
settled  by  a  written  constitution,  and  by  the  adjudication 
of  a  high,  and  in  former  years  at  least,  a  pure  tribunal 
established  expressly  for  that  purpose. 

Whether  the  impelling  principles  of  the  people  of  the 
United  States  are  in  harmony  with  the  governmental  prin- 
ciples, however,  is  a  question,  though  we  think  not  a 
very  difficult  one;  as  it  is  admitted  on  all  hands  that  our 
Government  has  undergone  and  is  still  undergoing  modi- 
fications. 

And  how  far  this  process  is  to  proceed  can  only  be  de- 
termined by  examining  the  force  and  tendency  of  those 
principles  in  human  nature,  which  are  driving  us  along. 
And  when  and  where  this  force  shall  expend  itself,  or 
whether  it  will  increase  in  momentum,  as  well  as  the  goal 
at  which  it  will  eventually  land  us,  are  questions  that  can 
only  be  determined  upon  the  principles  of  human  nature, 
as  we  find  them  actually  existing  in  the  individuals  of  our 
political  society. 

Forces  can  only  be  estimated  and  tendencies  appreci- 
ated by  principles  derived  from  actual  observation  or  ex- 
perience. And  the  only  sure  guide  we  can  have  to  test 
the  validity  of  any  principle  which  we  may  have  drawn 
from  human  nature  is,  that  old  one — the  experience  of' 
the  past.  We  take  man's  nature,  morally,  intellectually, 
religiously,  socially  and  politically,  to  be  the  same  to-day 
that  it  always  has  been  heretofore.  Like  causes  will  pro- 
duce like  effects  upon  like  subjects  all  the  world  over. 
Were  it  not  so,  no  one  could  guess  the  condition  of  a.> 
p-eople  an  hour  hence,  or  be  able  to  devise  any  govern- 


ment  and  laws,  which  would  anticipate  and  be  sufficient 
for  the  ordinary  contingencies  of  society. 

A  knowledge  of  the  laws  of  human  nature,  therefore, 
must  necessarily  precede  that  of  government,  with  every 
one  who  would  judge  of  the  utility  or  durability  of  gov- 
ernments. For,  from  the  very  nature  of  man,  the  ordi- 
nary and  continually  repeated  history  of  the  past,  may  be 
expected  to  proceed  far  into  the  future.  The  establish- 
ment of  any  and  every  government  presupposes  a  repeti- 
tion of  history. 

In  the  Bible  we  read  that  the  first  man  that  was  born 
killed  the  second  one,  and  murders  have  occurred  ever 
since. 

No  government  would  provide  laws  to  prevent  or  pun- 
ish arson,  were  not  incendiaries  anticipated.  Men  have 
rights,  and  they  may  be  wronged.  And  to  protect  men  in 
their  rights,  to  secure  their  lives,  their  health,  their  prop- 
erty, their  reputation,  their  liberty,  and  their  pursuit  of  hap- 
piness, our  fathers  justly  concluded  that  governments  are 
or  ought  to  be  instituted.  These  familiar  principles, 
founded  in  nature,  are  easily  understood. 

But  when  we  carry  our  minds  away  from  the  ordinary 
contingencies,  for  which  governments  ought  to  provide, 
and  look  into  the  principles  of  government  itself,  we  too 
often  fail  to  find  in  human  nature  the  true  principles  upon 
which  all  those  governments,  which  were  intended  to  be 
benefactions  to  mankind,  must  be  conducted.  This,  we 
are  compelled  to  say,  for  we  believe  it,  is  the  case  now  to 
a  great  degree  in  our  land,  respecting  our  own  beneficient 
institutions. 

The  system  of  government  which  our  fathers  estab- 
lished, we  claim,  contains  a  philosophy,  which,  unfortu- 
nately, in  our  opinion,  has  been  obscured  by  political 
aspirants.  This  philosophy  itself  is  complicated,  and 
may  with  ease,  by  the  demagogue,  be  wrongfully  applied 
to  men's  passion  for  liberty,  and  thus  lead  them  blindly 
on  to  fatal  precipices. 

And  in  order  to  make  ourselves  understood,  and  to  ex- 
hibit the  points  which  we  propose  to  discuss,  we  must 
first  clear  the  way,  that  the  reader  may  be  able  to  see  and 
mark  our  steps 
2 


6 

The  discussion  must  necessarily  be  argumentative,  and 
we  shall  be  compelled  to  deal  in  some  degree  with  details 
and  elementary  principles,  the  knowledge  of  which  the 
reader  must  be  supposed  to  possess,  or  of  which  he  must 
inform  himself. 

We  will  give  our  views  in  general  principles,  and  with- 
out partizan  feeling,  and  without  fear,  favor  or  expectation 
from  anybody.  And  in  the  first  place,  taking  up  the  first 
set  of  principles,  of  which  we  have  spoken  in  the  begin- 
ning, let  us  consider  for  a  moment  who  the  persons  are 
that  are  really  governed  by  positive  institutions,  and  what 
it  is  that  governs  them.  An  institution  which  does  not  in 
any  manner  control  men's  actions,  cannot  with  any  pro- 
priety be  said  to  govern  them.  In  an  absolute  monarchy, 
in  which  a  certain  person  dictates  whatever  regulations 
he  may  see  fit,  that  monarch  certainly  is  not  the  subject 
of  any  civil  government.  If  he  follow  and  regulate  his 
conduct  by  any  rules  at  all,  they  are  only  such  as  he  him- 
self has  prescribed  for  himself.  And  if  he  conscientiously 
and  rigidly  follow  those  rules,  and  they  be  humane  and 
good,  he  may  then  indeed  be  said  to  be  under  a  moral 
government;  but  his  actions  are  not  at  all  in  any  manner 
controlled  by  any  positive  institution  of  his  country. 
And  wherever  such  a  government  exists  among  men,  it 
exists  not  to  be  governed,  but  to  govern. 

And  there  is  in  every  government  on  earth  an  ungov- 
ernable something  somewhere  which  governs.  And  that 
ungovernable  something,  and  those  persons  whose  ac- 
tions are  controlled  by  it,  constitute  the  government  and 
the  governed. 

Now,  the  ancients  tell  us,  that  among  men  only  three 
simple  forms  of  government  can  exist,  viz:  an  absolute 
monarchy,  in  which  the  will  of  the  monarch  is  the  govern- 
ment; an  oligarchy,  in  which  a  few  powerful  individuals 
bound  together  by  like  tastes,  sympathies  and  interests, 
prescribe  those  rules  of  action  which  may  seem  agreeable 
to  themselves,  for  the  people  to  observe;  and  a  pure 
republic,  in  which  the  will  of  the  majority  decides  all 
points  in  controversy,  and  forces  its  decisions  upon  the 
the  minority.  Every  form  of  government  known  to  man, 
they  tell  us,  may  be  resolved  into  one  or  the  other  of 
these  simple  forms;  or  else  it  is  an  admixture  or  blending 


together  of  the  three  or  two  of  them.  And  in  each  of 
these  simple  forms,  the  principle  respecting  the  govern- 
ment and  the  governed  is  exactly  the  same. 

When  the  will  of  the  monarch  changes,  then  the  regu- 
lations of  the  monarchy  immediately  change;  when  the 
oligarchs  take  other  notions,  then  the  oligarchy  assumes 
a  different  shape;  and  when  the  majority  adopt  new  opin- 
ions, then  new  regulations  are  established  in  the  republic. 
And  it  matters  not  whether  the  gvoerned  be  affected  by 
such  changes  or  not,  they  must  submit. 

The  government  and  the  governed,  in  each  of  these 
three  simple  forms,  are  distinctly  marked  out  in  the  same 
manner.  And  each  of  these  simple  forms  contains  an 
elementary  ungovernable  principle  of  government,  and 
the  three  together  contain  all  the  elementary  principles, 
which  we  find  to  exist  in  any  government.  And  civil  lib- 
erty, the  liberty  of  individuals,  or,  to  use  Blackstone's 
definition,  which  is  approved  by  the  learned  in  such  mat- 
ters, "natural  liberty  so  far  restrained,  but  no  farther 
than  is  necessary  for  the  good  of  the  public,"  never  has, 
and,  from  the  very  nature  of  man,  never  can  exist  in  either 
of  these  simple  forms.  They  are,  each  of  them,  absolute 
tyrannies,  of  which  monarchy  is  the  least  oppressive. 

In  modern  times  neither  of  these  simple  forms  exist 
among  the  Caucasian  race.  Russia,  perhaps,  comes  near- 
est to  a  despotism,  though  pure  monarchy  is  now  confined 
to  the  Asiatics  and  Africans. 

Keeping  these  elementary  principles  of  government  in 
view,  let  us  now  carry  our  thoughts  to  England,  the  gov- 
ernment of  which  most  nearly  resembles  our  own,  and  in 
which  the  liberty  of  the  subject  has  been  better  cared  for 
than  in  any  other  government  of  Europe,  and  in  that  gov- 
ernment we  shall  find  all  the  three  simple  elements  of 
government  spoken  of,  blended  together.  The  Crown, 
being  a  pure  monarchy;  the  Lords,  spiritual  and  tempo- 
ral, being  an  oligarchy;  and  the  Commons  a  republic. 

Within  certain  monarchial  limits  the  Crown  is  absolute, 
it  being  one  of  the  corner-stones  of  their  political  edifice 
that  ' '  the  king  can  do  no  wrong. "  He  is  not  amenable  at 
all  for  any  political  or  private  act,  to  any  law  or  power  in 
the  kingdom.  He  cannot  even  be  questioned  respecting 


8 

his  actions.  And  althongh  Charles  Rex  was  actually 
tried,  condemned  and  executed,  there  is  no  intelligent 
Englishman  but  that  will  say  it  was  done  contrary  to  the 
letter  and  spirit  of  the  British  Constitution.  It  was  vio- 
lence, and  not  law. 

There  is  nothing  whatever  in  the  British  Constitution 
that  looks  in  the  slightest  degree  towards  governing  the 
king;  that  is,  towards  making  the  king  a  subject. 

But  lest  a  bad  man  thus  situated  might  do  infinite  mis- 
chief to  the  people,  there  are  certain  regulations  thrown 
around  him,  not  indeed  to  affect  in  any  manner  his  person, 
not  to  make  him  do  any  positive  act,  which  he  may  not  wish 
to  do,  but  to  keep  his  hands  off  the  liberty  of  the  subjects. 
And  these  regulations  have  been  won  for  the  most  part  by 
the  sword,  from  the  prerogative  which  once  approached 
almost  to  despotism  with  the  English  Crown.  For  this 
purpose  of  protecting  the  subject  is  the  provision,  that 
the  king  shall  do  his  political  acts  by  an  agent  or  minister, 
and  that  this  minister  shall  be  held  responsible  for  his 
acts;  and  he  may  be  tried,  condemned  and  executed  for 
them,  and  in  such  trial  he  shall  not  be  permitted  to  plead 
in  defense  the  command  of  the  king.  If,  therefore,  the 
king  command  him  to  do  an  an  act  not  warranted  by  the 
laws,  he  shall  not,  indeed,  disobey,  and  remain  his  minis- 
ter; but  his  safety  is  to  resign  and  cease  to  be  the  agent 
of  the  Crown. 

The  king,  also,  shall  not  suspend  the  writ  of  habeas 
corpus,  without  the  Lords  and  Commons  in  Parliament 
advising  him  to  do  so. 

The  Commons,  also,  may  refuse  to  furnish  money  lo  en- 
able the  king  to  accomplish  any  injurious  measure,  which 
he  may  contemplate,  and  so  on. 

But  all  these  regulations  respecting  the  executive  power 
are  not  instruments  put  into  the  hands  of  the  Lords  or 
Commons,  or  both  together,  by  which  they  may  make  the 
king  a  subject  of  civil  government,  but  they  are  instru- 
ments which  shall  be  used  to  prevent  the  Crown  from 
governing  improperly. 

In  the  mixed  government  of  England,  therefore,  the 
Crown  is,  within  certain  limits,  a  true  representative  of 
an  absolute  monarchy;  one  of  the  simple  elements  of 
government,  that  of  monarchy,  is  found  in  it. 


If,  now,  we  take  a  view  of  the  House  of  Lords,  we 
shall  readily  determine  that  it  is  a  true  representative  of 
an  oligarchy.  The  Lords  only  have  the  privilege  by 
birth  of  being  called  to  be  the  advisers  of  the  king.  And 
in  more  remote  times,  when  the  sessions  of  Parliament 
were  less  frequent,  the  Peers  frequently  met  in  conven- 
tion to  consider  the  state  of  the  realm,  and  to  inform  and 
advise  the  Crown.  A  Peer,  individually,  also,  has  the 
right  to  submit  respectfully  any  information  which  he  may 
deem  of  importance  to  the  Crown. 

A  Peer  charged  with  treason  or  felony,  or  of  misprision 
of  treason  or  felony,  can  be  tried  only  by  his  Peers,  if  he 
so  request.  And  although  the  persons  of  Peers  may  be 
attached,  in  order  to  make  them  obey  the  orders  of  the 
Court,  they  cannot  be  arrested  in  any  civil  suit  upon  the 
complaint  or  showing  of  anybody.  A  Peer  answers  an  ac- 
tion at  law  or  bill  in  equity,  not  upon  his  oath,  but  upon 
his  honor.  And  as  a  witness  he  need  not  take  an  oath  in 
any  case,  except  when  before  the  high  Court  of  Parlia- 
ment. He  cannot  lose  his  nobility,  except  by  death  or 
attainder,  and  he  has  various  other  legal  exemptions. 
And  his  social  privileges  and  moral  influence  in  society 
are  still  greater  than  his  civil  powers. 

All  this  certainly  looks  like  oligarchy,  and  what  else  is 
it  ?  Within  a  certain  sphere  it  is  a  complete  oligarchy. 
A  Peer,  to  be  sure,  cannot  with  impunity  deprive  a  com- 
moner of  his  life,  his  liberty,  his  property,  or  his  reputa- 
tion. But  he  himself  is  independent  of  the  smiles  or 
frowns  of  anybody  except  his  Peers.  He  looks  only  to 
his  Peers  and  the  Crown  for  promotion  of  any  kind. 

The  House  of  Commons  is  intended  to  represent  only 
the  purely  democratic  element  in  the  British  Constitution, 
and  to  a  considerable  degree  it  is  a  democracy;  though  it 
has  not  heretofore  represented  a  pure  republic,  so  well 
as  the  Crown  has  represented  a  monarchy,  and  the  Peers 
an  oligarchy.  The  democratic  element,  however,  is  gain- 
ing strength  every  day  in  England.  And,  upon  the 
whole,  the  British  Constitution  is  really  a  blending  to- 
gether of  the  three  simple  elements  of  government,  so 
often  mentioned  by  political  philosophers.  And  in  Eng- 
land, that  ungovernable  and  absolute  power  which  is  con- 
tained in  each  of  these  simple  elements,  and  which  must 


10 

exist  somewhere  in  every  government,  can  exert  itself 
only  by  the  agreement  of  these  three  elements.  Now,  the 
keeping  of  these  three  elements  each  in  its  proper  orbit, 
is  what  the  British  statesmen  call  the  balance  of  the  Eng- 
lish Constitution,  the  aegis  of  freedom,  the  paladium  of 
English  liberty,  and  so  on. 

And  this  aegis  or  paladium,  they  tell  us,  is  preserved 
by  two  efficient  causes  and  arrangements :  First,  by  the 
distribution  of  different  powers  to  each  of  those  elements 
in  Parliament,  so  that  the  legitimate  action  of  one,  if 
tending  to  produce  mischief,  may  be  opposed  by  the  le- 
gitimate action  of  another,  or  the  other  two;  and  second, 
by  the  different  interests  of  each  of  these  elements,  and 
of  the  persons  intrusted  with  their  management.  The 
latter  consideration,  the  different  interests,  seems  to  me 
to  me  to  be  the  foundation  of  all  that  is  valuable  in  the 
former.  For  although  a  certain  set  of  men  may  have  in- 
struments placed  in  their  hands  to  prevent  another  set 
from  doing  wrong,  yet  where  the  design  is  not  opposed  to 
their  wishes,  they  will  never  use  them.  And  the  fulcrum 
upon  which  their  wishes  turn  will  generally  be  interest. 

History  is  full  of  the  quarrels  between  an  aristocracy 
and  their  king,  between  the  people  and  an  aristocracy, 
and  between  the  people  and  the  king.  To  get  rid  of  an 
odious  aristocracy,  the  people  have  frequently  joined  with 
the  king;  again  the  aristocracy  and  the  people  have  united 
and  humbled  the  king;  and  then  again  they  have  separ- 
ated and  warred  with  each  other.  This  is  the  history  of 
the  internal  affairs  of  the  governments  of  Europe,  and 
these  conflicting  interests  and  wishes,  according  to  writers, 
are  made  to  work  in  harmony  by  the  British  Constitution. 
We  have  thus  endeavored  to  bring  to  view  the  simple  ele- 
ments of  government,  and  to  refer  to  their  blending  in 
the  English  Government.  That  Government,  in  appear- 
ance, and  in  some  respects  in  fact,  resembles  our  own;  so 
much  so  that  it  might  be  supposed,  if  we  should  discard 
a  few  names,  pompous  shows  and  parades,  the  two  gov- 
ernments would  be  substantially  the  same ;  but  that  is  a 
mistake,  they  are  very  different. 

Now  the  English  Government  is  a  matter  of  history;  it 
has  endured  for  several  centuries,  and  passed  through 
fiery  trials,  and  our  own  in  part  has  been  taken  from  it; 


11 

we  may,  therefore,  use  it,  not  only  to  bring  the  principles 
of  our  Government  into  clear  view,  but  also  to  gain  im- 
portant information  by  the  contrasts,  the  similarities,  and 
the  identities. 

Coming  now  to  the  consideration  of  the;  political  insti- 
tutions of  the  United  States,  let  us  first  determine  for 
ourselves  what  kind  of  government  we  have.  Did  our 
fathers  intend  to  establish  a  pure  monarchy,  an  oligarchy, 
or  a  pure  republic?  Or  did  they  intend  to  unite  and 
blend  these  three  elements  ?  That  they  did  not  intend  to 
erect  a  monarchy,  or  an  oligarchy,  is  too  obvious  to  need 
remark;  and  that  they  did  not  intend  to  blend  together 
the  three  elements  of  government,  must  become  equally 
clear  upon  slight  reflection. 

There  is  no  functionary  above  the  law  in  our  system. 
The  President  is  put  into  power  by  the  people,  and  is  ex- 
pected, if  he  live,  to  become  a  private  citizen  again.  He 
is  amenable  for  both  his  political  and  private  acts.  The 
element  of  monarchy  does  not  exist  in  the  Presidential 
office. 

Neither  are  the  Senators  to  be  taken  from  any  class  of 
citizens.  They  derive  their  political  positions  mediately, 
though  not  immediately,  from  the  people,  and  indepen- 
dently of  their  tapestry  of  office  for  a  time,  their  social 
influence  can  be  sustained  only  in  a  like  manner  as  that 
of  other  individuals.  It  was  not  intended  by  the  found- 
ers of  our  Government  that  the  element  of  oligarchy 
should  be  in  it.  We  then  have  only  the  element  of  de- 
mocracy left  to  deal  with  in  the  institutions  which  our 
fathers  delivered  to  us. 

Yet  we  have  a  republic  possessing  very  different  phases 
from  any  other  wrhich  has  heretofore  existed  upon  the 
face  of  tne  earth,  and  to  these  phases  we  must  now  give 
our  attention;  and  we  respectfully  request  that  the  reader 
will  give  his  patient  attention  while  we  endeavor  to  un- 
ravel in  detail,  as  well  as  we  are  able,  some  of  the  prin- 
ciples of  the  most  complicated  system  of  goverment  on 
the  earth. 

We  shall  expose  without  hesitation  what  appears  to  us 
to  be  defects,,,  or  rather  insecurities,  in  order  that  the 
reader  may  see  the  dangers  to  which  we  may  be  exposed, 


12 

and  when  we  shall  have  the  details  before  us,  we  will  en- 
deavor to  show  the  dangers  now  threatening,  and  give  our 
inferences  respecting  the  probable  downfall  of  our  re: 
public. 

The  history  of  the  formation  of  our  Constitution  and 
Government  may  be  learned  from  the  Federalist,  from  El- 
liott's debates,  and  from  a  recent  work  by  Curtis,  in  two 
volumes.  The  Constitution  itself,  and  these  sources  men- 
tioned, shall  furnish  us  with  the  facts  which  we  will  use. 
We  will  state  these  facts  in  our  own  language,  without 
quoting;  but  should  anyone  fear  that  we  are  varying 
them,  he  can  easily  refer  to  the  sources  from  whence  they 
came. 

And  the  first  fact  which  we  shall  notice  is,  that  the 
founders  of  our  system  did  not  intend  it  to  contain  any 
other  element  than  democracy;  a  truth  which  we  deduced 
from  the  Constitution  itself,  a  moment  ago;  and  yet,  in 
juxtaposition  with  this,  we  will  place  the  fact  that  not  one 
of  the  founders  of  our  Government  had  any  faith  what- 
ever in  a  pure  republic ;  that  is,  in  a  republic  such  as  we 
have  described,  in  which  the  will  of  the  majority  shall 
determine  /ill  points  which  may  be  brought  into  contro- 
versy, and  force  its  decisions  upon  the  minority.  They 
knew  too  well  the  inevitable  consequences  of  such  a  gov- 
ernment. And  hence  they  formed  a  constitution  which 
should  carry  our  system  away  from  pure  democracy,  and 
shape  and  limit  the  effects  of  the  popular  will.  That  was 
the  very  intention  in  framing  the  Constitution.  But  to 
this  Constitution  itself  we  will  come,  for  it  is  the  work  of 
our  fathers,  and  the  work  of  an  artist  shows  the  artist's 
designs.  And  we  will  first  notice  that  this  instrument 
provides  the  manner  by  which  our  political  liberty  shall 
be  preserved.  But  by  political  liberty  we  do  not  mean 
civil  liberty.  Eussia  enjoys,  perhaps,  as  much  political 
liberty  as  any  other  country;  that  is,  her  people  collect- 
ively under  the  government,  such  as  it  is,  can  act  with 
little  restraint  imposed  upon  them  by  foreign  powers. 
Collectively,  her  people  enjoy  great  liberty;  individually, 
but  little.  Collective  liberty  we  call  political  liberty;  in- 
dividual liberty,  civil  liberty.  Our  fathers  achieved  our 
political  liberty  when  they  drove  the  British  from  our 
shores;  they  then  set  to  work  to  secure  our  civil  liberties. 


13 

At  the  arrangements  in  the  Constitution  for  preserving 
our  political  liberty,  we  will  not  look.  Their  considera- 
tion is  of  no  importance  to  us  in  our  present  investiga- 
tion. 

The  Constitution  also  provides  for  carrying  out  any 
measure  under  it,  which  may  be  adopted  for  internal 
safety,  for  improvements,  for  the  appointment  and  sup- 
port of  officials,  etc.  We  will  pass  over  all  these,  and 
come  to  the  consideration  of  those  provisions  which 
guard  and  secure  to  individuals  their  civil  liberties,  for 
these  are  the  ones  of  the  greatest  importance  to  us  at  pres- 
ent; and  such  provisions  in  the  Constitution  of  every  Gov- 
ernment, which  has  one,  are  always  negations  of  the 
power  which  governs  in  the  country.  They  are  all  ex- 
pressed in  negative  sentences,  or  directly  implied  in  af- 
firmative ones.  In  our  Constitution  they  run  in  this 
manner;  "No  title  of  nobility,  etc.,"  "No  bill  of  at- 
tainder, or  ex  post  facto  law,  etc. , "  "  The  privilege  of  the 
writ  of  habeas  corpus  shall  not,  etc. , "  "  Congress  shall 
make  no  law  respecting  an  establishment  of  religion, 
etc.,"  "Private  property  shall  not  be  taken,  etc.,"  and  in 
affirmations  implying  negations,  such  as,  "In  all  criminal 
prosecutions  the  accused  shall  be  tried  by  an  impartial 
jury,  etc., "that  is,  he  shall  be  tried  in  no  other  manner. 
The  affirmations  respecting  the  administration  of  the 
Government  also  imply  negations.  And  such  provisions 
in  a  Constitution  are  always  obstructions,  purposely 
placed  in  the  way  of  the  governing  power  in  the  country. 
What  is  the  governing  power  in  an  absolute  monarchy  ? 
The  will  of  the  monarch.  What  is  it  in  an  oligarchy  ? 
The  will  of  the  oligarchs.  What  in  a  republic  ?  The  will 
of  the  majority.  What  are  these  provisions  in  our  Con- 
stitution for?  To  obstruct  the  will  of  that  majority. 
That  is  the  ultimate  design  of  them  all.  And  by  these 
provisions  we  are  kept  away  from  a  pure  republic,  in 
which  our  fathers  had  no  faith.  Nor  has  anybody  else, 
who  has  read  anything  of  the  history  of  man,  any  faith  in 
such  a  government.  They  have  no  written  Constitution 
in  England — they  do  not  need  any.  Civil  liberty,  in  a 
country  which  blends  the  three  simple  elements  of  gov- 
ernment, as  in  Great  Britain,  will  be  protected  by  that 
very  arrangement,  if  these  elements  be  well  balanced. 
2 


u 

Now  if  the  negations,  expressed  and  implied,  in  our  Con- 
stitution, can  be  sustained  and  kept  up  in  good  faith,  our 
Republic  will  stand  forever;  but  if  they  cannot  be  sus- 
tained, the  Constitution  must  pass  away  in  effect  and  in 
fact,  and  our  Republic,  which  our  fathers  established  will 
fall.  How,  then,  are  they  to  be  sustained?  The  framers 
of  our  Constitution  considered  that  very  question,  and 
here  was  their  great  difficulty:  They  might  have  put  into 
the  Constitution  a  clause,  stating  that  these  provisions 
shall  never  be  amended,  changed  or  evaded.  But  by  thus 
elevating  the  Constitution  above  every  power  in  the"  land, 
they  would  have  inserted  a  purely  monarchial  principle, 
without  a  monarch  to  sustain  it.  The  difficulties  here, 
among  an  agitating  people,  are  enormous,  and  our  fathers 
looked  over  the  republics  that  had  lived  for  a  day  and 
passed  away,  and  they  examined  other  governments. 
The  difficulties  consist  in  this,  that  all  the  negations  in  a 
Constitution  have  entirely  a  different  effect  in  a  Republic 
from  that  which  they  have  in  a  limited  monarchy.  We 
have  not  room  in  this  pamphlet  to  take  up  these  negations 
one  by  one,  and  show  that  each  of  them  is  but  a  bar  in 
effect,  whatever  may  be  their  ostensible  purpose,  to  the 
popular  will.  But  we  will  illustrate  our  position  by  ex- 
amining one  of  them,  and  the  same  principle  brought  out 
will  apply  to  them  all.  Take  the  suspension  of  the  writ 
of  habeas  corpus,  for  example.  Our  Constitution  says  that 
the  writ  of  habeas  corpus  shall  not  be  suspended  except 
in  certain  cases.  We  propose  now  to  show  that  this  ne  • 
gation  is  a  bar  placed,  in  effect,  right  against  the  peo- 
ple's will,  and  not  against  that  of  the  President  of  the 
United  States,  as  a  man  holding  power  in  his  hands.  This, 
we  say,  is  the  ultimate  effect  of  that  provision.  And  in 
order  to  make  this  position  clear,  let  us  contract  this  pro- 
vision in  our  Constitution  with  a  similar  provision,  in  ap- 
pearance, but  only  in  appearance,  in  the  British  Govern- 
ment, in  which,  as  we  have  shown,  there  exists  the  ele- 
ment of  pure  monarchy.  The  Crown,  says  the  British 
Constitution,  shall  never  suspend  the  writ  of  habeas  cor- 
pus without  the  consent  of  the  Lords  and  Commons  in 
Parliament.  Now  what  power  does  this  negation  bar  in 
England  ?  It  is  a  bar  to  the  will  of  a  man  who  is  a  mon- 
arch and  above  the  law,  and  who,  from  malice  or  some  other 


15 

Eersonal  motive,  may  attempt  to  lay  his  hands  upon  the 
berties  of  a  subject;  and  for  such  actions  he  cannot  be 
brought  to  account  by  any  power  in  the  kingdom. 

Look  now  at  the  President  of  the  United  States.  He 
is  a  subject,  and  can  be  reached  by  law.  He  must  step 
out  of  the  White  House  in  a  little  time,  if  he  be  not  im- 
peached and  turned  out,  and  if  from  malice  or  some  per- 
sonal motive  he  suspend  the  writ  of  habeas  corpus  to  im- 
prison men,  so  soon  as  he  steps  out  the  prison  doors  fly 
open,  the  prisoners  step  out,  and  the  President  is  liable 
to  step  in.  Without  this  provision  in  our  Constitution, 
an  unpopular  President  could  merely  harrass men  a  little; 
and  no  such  President,  who  possessed  any  forethought, 
would  dare  subject  himself  to  such  liabilities.  But  re- 
verse the  picture :  suppose  the  President  to  be  the  expo- 
nent of  the  popular  will,  that  the  popular  will  all  the  time 
goes  with  him,  then  he  can  suspend  the  writ  of  habeas 
corpus  if  he  see  fit,  and  bid  defiance  to  the  true  intent  of 
that  provision  of  our  Constitution,  and  there  is  no  power 
in  the  land  that  can  sustain  the  law.  This  negation  in 
our  Constitution,  in  effect,  impinges  against  the  popular 
will;  and  so  does  every  other  negation  in  the  Constitution 
of  every  Hepublic. 

But  some  one  will  say,  there  is  no  danger  that  these  ne- 
gations in  our  Constitution  will  be  destroyed  or  evaded, 
or  at  farthest,  the  Constitution  will  only  be  remodeled  to 
suit  the  advancement  of  society.  In  our  opinion  not  one 
of  the  provisions  which  secure  to  individuals  their  civil 
liberty,  can  be  sustained  for  ten  years  longer,  unless  the 
tendencies  of  the  past  few  years  be  thrown  into  other 
channels;  and  for  this  reason,  because  the  means  which 
our  fathers  provided,  and  upon  which  they  relied  to  sus- 
tain these  safeguards,  unless  a  change  take  place,  will 
soon  have  no  power  in  the  country;  and  we  must  now  go 
into  the  elementary  principles  and  details  of  these  means. 

We  stated  but  a  little  while  ago,  that  in  England  their 
statesmen  claim  that  they  have  in  their  political  system  a 
balance  of  power  and  a  balance  of  interests.     The  bal- 
I  ance  of  power  sustains  civil  liberty;  and  the  balance  of 
;  interests  sustains  this  balance  of  power.     Now  how  did 
our  fathers  expect  to  maintain  civil  liberty  in  this  country? 
Did  they  suppose  that  individuals  could  be  protected  in 


16 

their  rights  without  any  constituted  power  in  the  land  to 
afford  protection  ?  If  they  did,  there  was  certainly  no 
need  of  having  any  Government  whatever.  Did  they  ex  - 
pect  that  if  they  should  write  a  Constitution  and  throw  it 
out  upon  the  ground,  by  virtue  of  the  very  power  of  its 
sentences,  all  men  could  be  protected  ?  They  were,  cer- 
tainly not  so  insane.  And  to  state  the  gist  of  the  matter, 
they  endeavored  to  establish  a  balance  of  power  and  a 
balance  of  interest  in  America,  as  in  England,  but  by 
different  means ;  the  one  to  sustain  the  Government  in  its 
constitutional  channel,  and  the  other  to  maintain  civil 
liberty. 

They  discarded  the  monarch  and  the  oligarchy,  and  in 
their  room  they  put  an  executive  and  a  judiciary.  There 
are  three  powers  in  England,  viz :  a  monarch,  an  oligarchy 
and  the  commons;  these  constitute  the  balance  of  power 
in  England. 

There  are  three  powers  in  America:  the  the  executive, 
the  legislative  and  the  judiciary.  These  were  intended 
by  our  fathers  to  be  a  balance  of  power  in  America. 

Having  said  this  much  concerning  the  powers,  we  must 
leave  their  further  consideration  for  a  time,  and  consider 
somewhat  in  detail,  the  manner  in  which  our  fathers  in- 
tended the  balance  of  interest  in  America  to  be  regulated. 

The  old  confederation  had  failed.  Its  history  teaches 
the  same  lesson  as  that  of  the  Amphyctean  league  of  the 
Greeks;  the  Hanseatic  league,  and  every  other  confedera- 
tion; and  when  the  Convention  of  1787  met  in  Philadel- 
phia, to  take  into  consideration  the  formation  of  a  new 
Government,  two  plans  were  brought  forward;  the  one 
called  the  New  Jersey,  and  the  other  the  Virginia  plan. 
The  New  Jersey  plan  contemplated  a  stronger  confedera- 
tion of  States,  while  the  Virginia  plan  aimed  at  a  Nation- 
al Government.  The  framers  of  the  New  Jersey  plan 
desired  that  each  State,  however  small  its  territory  and 
population,  should  have  an  equal  representation  in  Con- 
gress; while  the  others  sought  a  representation  according 
to  population.  This  put  the  question  of  the  balance  of 
interest  directly  in  issue,  and  after  discussing  the  matter, 
they,  as  it  were,  split  the  difference  between  the  two 
plans,  and  they  made  the  Presidency  and  the  House  na- 
tional, and  the  Senate  confederate;  that  is,  a  certain  and 


17 

definite  population  was  to  have  one  representative  in  the 
House,  throughout  New  York,  Pennsylvania  and  the 
other  States,  while  in  the  Senate  each  State  was  to  have 
two  Senators,  irrespective  of  its  population.  The  Presi- 
dency also  was  to  be  national,  each  State  having  as  many 
electoral  votes  as  it  might  be  entitled  to  Eepresentatives  and 
Senators  in  Congress.  Considering,  therefore,  the  peo- 
ple of  New  York  as  a  part  of  the  population  of  the  Gen- 
eral Government,  and  in  the  House  they  are  represented 
as  the  rest  of  the  people  are,  but  in  the  Senate  they  are 
not.  Considering  New  York  as  a  State,  and  in  the  Sen- 
ate it  is  represented  as  the  rest  of  the  States,  but  in  the 
the  House  it  is  not.  In  this  respect,  therefore,  the  Sen- 
ate is  confederate  and  the  House  is  national.  Now  let  us 
see  what  this  arrangement  accomplishes  in  the  practical 
working  of  the  Government. 

If  New  York  and  Pennsylvania,  or  should  the  valley  of 
the  Mississippi,  contain  more  inhabitants  than  all  the 
other  States  put  together,  in  the  House  they  can  carry  any 
measure  that  they  may  desire;  but  when  it  comes  to  the 
Senate,  if  the  other  States  be  more  in  number,  the  meas- 
ure may  be  defeated.  What  is  the  effect  of  this  arrange- 
ment respecting  the  balance  of  interests  of  the  different 
sections  of  our  country  ?  It  is  to  prevent  the  majority  of 
people,  if  collected  in  a  certain  section,  from  ruining  the 
minority  by  any  measure  which  they  otherwise  could 
carry,  and  which  might  not  be  restrained  by  any  other 
constitutional  bar.  Here,  then,  is  one  method  by  this 
arrangement  of  the  Senate,  for  balancing  sectional  in- 
terests. 

There  is  another  arrangement  which  is  supposed  to  have 
some  effect  upon  the  balance  of  interests :  a  Senator  shall 
hold  his  office  for  six  years,  and  a  Eepresentative  for  two; 
and  if  by  this  arrangement  the  interests  of  the  Senators 
and  Eepresentatives  from  the  same  State  should  be, 
throughout  the  United  States,  opposed  to  each  other,  here 
would  be  a  national  balance  of  interests;  but  as,  in  fact, 
in  our  day  at  least,  they  are  not,  this  arrangement  affords 
no  balance  at  all.  The  balance  of  interest,  therefore,  in 
our  country,  is  maintained  only  by  the  confederate  nature 
of  the  Senate,  and  it  is  vibrated  by  States.  This  point 
of  our  Government — the  confederate  nature  of  the  Sen- 
b 


18 

ate — we  consider  will  be  exposed  to  danger  in  a  short 
time;  because  it  stands  right  in  the  way  of  the  practical 
results  of  a  doctrine  now  taught  and  believed  throughout 
the  North;  we  refer  to  the  doctrine  of  popular  will;  that 
the  majority  must  rule.  The  President's  veto,  and  the 
different  terms  of  office  of  Senators  and  Representatives, 
can  affect  the  balance  of  interests  but  little.  The  nature 
of  the  Senate  is  the  only  effectual  arrangement,  and  in 
less  than  ten  years  more,  under  the  present  popular-will- 
doctrine,  the  Senate  must  be  changed;  for  it  protects  the 
majority  of  States  from  the  majority  of  people  inhabiting 
the  minority  of  States.  And  it  is  taught  all  through  the 
North,  and  believed,  too,  to  be  an  axiom  in  a  Republic, 
that  the  will  of  the  majority  must  govern.  That  this  is 
true  in  a  pure  Republic,  no  one  will  deny;  but  that  our 
fathers  intended  the  will  of  the  majority  on  all  points, 
even  under  the  other  provisions  of  the  Constitution,  to 
rule  in  America,  is  plainly  contradicted  by  their  erection 
of  this  barrier  in  the  Senate.  They  arranged  the  Senate 
as  it  is  for  no  other  purpose  than  to  defeat  sectional  ma- 
jorities. To  illustrate  further :  Suppose  the  New  England 
States  to-day  to  contain  sixty  million  of  inhabitants,  they 
would  then  have  the  majority  in  the  House,  and  in  it  they 
could  carry  any  measure  which  they  might  wish;  but  this 
measure  would  be  sure  to  be  defeated  in  the  Senate,  if 
distasteful  to  the  other  States.  Must  the  will  of  this  ma- 
jority govern  in  America  ?  If  it  must,  then  the  Senate 
must  be  remodeled. 

If  the  influx  of  population  should  continue  as  heretofore, 
in  a  few  years  the  valley  of  the  Mississippi  may  contain 
more  inhabitants  than  all  the  other  States  put  together. 
If  the  will  of  the  majority  must  govern,  give  them  the 
Government,  and  abolish  the  Senate.  But  the  majority 
in  America  never  can  rule  under  any  one  General  Gov- 
ernment. Will  the  Pacific  States  submit  to  be  ruled  in 
all  points  under  the  other  provisions  of  the  Constitution 
by  the  Atlantic  ?  I  do  not  believe  they  will  if  they  can 
help  it.  The  South  would  not  submit  until  forced  to  the 
will  of  sectional  majorities.  But  we  are  told  that  the 
reason  they  would  not  submit  is  because  they  were  slave- 
holders. And  the  Pacific  States  by  and  by  will  feel  like 
resisting  because  they  are  mine-holders;  and  the  north 


19 

Mississippi  valley  States  will  resist  because  they  are  corn- 
holders.  It  is  a  question  of  interest,  and  only  interest,  in 
each  case. 

A  Southern  planter,  certainly,  would  never  have  imper- 
illed his  life  for  a  negro  in  whom  he  had  no  interest  what- 
ever. And  should  the  Southern  people  all  be  removed 
from  their  homes,  and  people  from  the  North  take  their 
place,  in  a  short  time  a  local  interest  must  spring  up,  and 
under  cthe  popular-will  doctrine  that  the  will  of  the  ma- 
jority, though  sectional,  must  govern,  it  will  produce  the 
same  result  as  slavery.  The  will  of  a  sectional  majority 
never  can  be  made  to  govern  a  minority  nearly  approach- 
ing that  majority,  without  a  rupture,  where  the  interests 
are  strong.  And  the  geography  of  our  country  plainly 
indicates  that  strong  sectional  interests  must  arise.  In 
our  opinion  the  popular-will  doctrine  will  be  fatal  to  our 
Republic.  It  must  destroy  the  nature  of  the  Senate,  if 
every  State  be  represented  there  before  it  can  reach  its 
object.  And  if  this  balance  of  interest  in  our  Govern- 
ment be  destroyed  or  evaded,  it  must  produce  war,  if 
there  be  any  power  in  sections  to  make  war;  and  where 
the  power  to  make  war  is  wanting,  the  people  neverthe- 
less feel  that  they  are  subjected  to  a  species  of  slavery; 
and  hence  their  national  pride  and  patriotism — which  are 
the  conservators  of  republican  institutions — are  des- 
troyed. 

But  in  the  remarks  just  preceding,  \ve  have  been  en- 
deavoring to  show  the  arrangement  of  the  balance  of  in- 
terest in  our  Government,  and  the  manner  in  which  it  is 
vibrated.  We  return  now  to  the  consideration  of  the 
powers  of  our  Government,  and  of  the  manner  of  pre- 
serving and  adjusting  their  balance;  and  we  wish  to  be 
well  understood,  respecting  these  balances  of  interests 
and  of  powers  in  our  institutions.  For,  we  think  we  will 
be  able  to  show  before  we  close,  that  the  dangers  now 
threatening  these  balances  of  our  Government  are  very 
great.  There  certainly  must  be  a  balance  of  power  in 
every  Government  that  maintains  civil  liberty  in  the  land; 
an  absolute  monarchy  has  no  balance  of  power,  and  no 
liberty.  An  oligarchy  is  in  the  same  condition,  and  a 
pure  republic  is  a  tyranny  as  absolute  and  more  oppress- 
ive than  absolute  monarchy  itself:  and  if  the  people  of 


20 

America  wish  to  try  a  pure  Republic  in  this  broad  land  of 
ours,  they  may  aim  at  it,  but  they  will  wade  through  riv- 
ers of  blood,  and  land  themselves  at  last  only  in  anarchy 
and  despotism.  Such  are  our  honest  convictions,  and 
therefore  we  respectfully  entreat  the  reader  to  give  his 
patient  attention. 

And  in  order  to  make  this  matter  clear,  let  us  return  to 
the  mixed  government  of  England,  and  patiently  examine 
how  these  balances  of  interest  and  power  are  sustained 
there;  then  contrast  our  own  system  with  that,  and  I  think 
we  will  be  able  to  see  clearly  the  points  and  the  dangers 
which  threaten  them. 

Men  tell  us  that  our  institutions  are  in  no  danger,  be- 
cause they  do  not  look  to  the  points  where  the  dangers 
are  coming  like  an  avalanche. 

Leaving  now  the  consideration  of  our  own  system  out 
of  the  catalogue,  and  the  manner  of  preserving  the  bal- 
ances of  interest  and  of  power  in  England,  has  been  con- 
sidered the  best  in  the  world,  by  the  greatest  statesmen  of 
the  world  outside  of  England,  such  men  as  Montesqueau 
and  Necker,  in  France,  and  Hamilton  and  Madison  in 
America;  and  in  the  present  crisis  we  consider  it  of  great 
importance  to  be  familiar  with  these  principles,  for  by 
them  we  will  become  acquainted  with  our  own  situation. 
We  have  already  stated  that  British  statesmen,  and  oth- 
ers, too,  regard  the  civil  liberties  of  England  to  depend 
upon  the  adjustment  of  the  balance  of  interest  and  of  that 
of  power.  Our  civil  liberties,  also,  we  regard  as  depending 
upon  these  two  things.  And  the  balance  of  power  will 
always  vibrate  when  the  balance  of  interest  is  disturbed. 
No  power  among  men  can  be  exercised  for  any  considera- 
ble time  without  an  efficient  interest  to  support  it.  Now 
the  interests  which  underlie  and  support  each  of  the 
powers  in  the  British  Government,  are  immediate  as  well 
as  remote,  and  very  clear;  while  the  interests  underlying 
and  supporting  two  of  the  powers  in  our  Government,  are 
generally  remote,  and  sometimes  obscure.  And  when 
they  are  remote  and  obscure,  or  obscured  by  political 
aspirants,  these  powers  will  be  unsustained.  Let  us  ex- 
amine the  matter  in  detail,  and  let  us  first  look  at  the  im- 
mediate interests  in  England  and  in  America. 

What  immediate  interest  underlies  and  supports  the 


21 

power  of  the  Crown,  the  monarchial  element  in  the  Brit- 
ish Government  ? 

First.  The  life  of  the  sovereign,  and  then  the  lives  of 
his  household.  With  a  king  it  is,  to  be  a  king  or  die  I 
A  king  deposed  is  a  king  murdered,  almost  all  the  world 
over.  And  his  demise  in  such  manner  generally  involves 
the  danger  and  ruin  of  his  household  and  family  connec- 
tions. And  in  order  to  remain  a  king,  he  must  retain  in- 
tact, within  certain  limits,  all  the  privileges  and  prerog- 
atives of  monarchy,  its  power.  The  immediate  interests. 
of  the  king,  his  household,  and  relations  in  the  Crown, 
are  exceedingly  strong. 

How  is  it  with  the  immediate  interests  of  the  Presiden- 
tial office  ?  The  President,  who  holds  it,  has  in  it  the  im- 
mediate interest  of  a  hundred  thousand  dollars.  He  may 
conclude,  and  conclude  justly,  from  political  phases,  that 
he  will  hold  the  office  but  one  term;  and  he  can  intrigue, 
if  he  be  corrupt,  with  corrupt  men  in  Congress.  Suppose 
now  there  should  be  a  pressure  by  the  other  powers  of 
the  Government  upon  the  immunities  of  the  Presidential 
office,  where  is  the  immediate  interest  to  preserve  them 
intact  ?  The  President  can  sell  out  without  any  damage 
to  his  immediate  interests,  and  leave  our  country  without 
a  power  which  our  fathers  established  for  our  protection. 
A  Mexican  President  would  do  so  very  quickly.  A  patri- 
otic President,  of  course,  has  an  interest  in  the  preserva- 
tion of  the  immunities  of  his  office  intact;  but  that  inter- 
est is  remote,  it  is  merely  that  of  a  patriot  for  the  whole 
country.  We  will  look  into  the  remote  interests  by  and 
by.  Let  us  now  go  to  the  House  of  Lords,  the  next 
power  of  the  British  Government,  which  we  will  notice. 
What  are  the  immediate  interests  that  sustain  it  ?  The 
fortunes,  the  political  and  social  positions,  the  titles,  the 
honors,  the  exemptions,  everything  of  each  Lord  in  the 
kingdom,  which  he  holds  dear.  If  the  privileges  of  the 
House  of  Lords  be  attacked,  the  nobility  throughout  the 
land  will  resist. 

What  immediate  interests  support  our  Supreme  Court  ? 
The  salaries  of  the  Judges,  the  persons  who  have  cases 
before  it  to  be  decided,  and  innocent  persons  brought 
before  it  to  be  set  free,  are  all  the  immediate  interests, 
that  there  are  to  support  its  power. 


22 

What  immediate  interests  support  the  House  of  Com- 
mons ?  The  salaries  and  privileges  of  its  members,  and 
the  interests  of  the  Commons  of  the  country. 

What  immediate  interests  support  our  Congress  ?  The 
same  things  that  support  the  House  of  Commons. 

And  from  the  foregoing  analysis  it  must  appear,  we 
think,  that  the  immediate  interests  underlying  and  sus- 
taining the  power  of  the  Crown  and  House  of  Lords  in 
England,  are  much  stronger  than  those  immediate  inter- 
ests which  support  the  executive  and  the  judiciary  with 
us;  and  that  these  powers  in  Great  Britain  would  be  able 
so  far  as  immediate  interests  are  concerned,  to  withstand 
a  pressure  and  weather  a  storm  of  corruption  and  fanati- 
cism, which  would  irretrievably  sink 'the  immunities  of 
the  Presidency  and  Supreme  Court. 

But  we  come  now  to  the  consideration  of  those  remote 
interests  which  support  the  powers;  for  they  are  of  great 
importance  in  England,  and  of  the  utmost  importance  in 
America,  to  civil  liberty;  and  first,  we  will  consider  the 
remote  interests  which  support  the  powers  of  the  British 
Government.  And  after  what  has  been  already  said,  I 
think  we  need  not  tax  the  reader's  patience  with  many 
details,  or  a  rigid  analysis.  You  will  understand  these 
truths  of  human  nature,  which  history  and  philosophy 
have  demonstrated  in  Europe.  A  monarch  is  scarcely  an 
apology  of  power  among  a  free  thinking  people,  unless  he 
surround  himself  with  a  nobility  whom  he  can  interpose 
between  himself  and  the  people.  Bring  him  face  to  face 
with  the  people  and  down  he  goes.  A  nobility  without  a 
head,  without  a  monarch,  cannot  stand  before  an  indepen- 
dent thinking  people  either.  Their  own  dissensions  will 
destroy  their  concert  of  action,  and  the  people  will  con- 
sider them  but  mischief-makers  and  oppressors,  and  throw 
them  off.  Let  us  now  consider  how  the  principles  of  hu- 
man nature  work  in  England.  If  the  nobility  and  people 
both  attack  the  king,  he  must  give;  but  the  nobility  will 
never  go  so  far  as  to  abolish  the  immunities  of  the  Crown 
for  it  is  their  remote  interest  to  preserve  them.  Their 
utter  destruction  only  removes  an  obstruction  to  the  ruin 
of  the  nobility  themselves.  They  may  be  willing  to  de- 
pose a  bad  man,  but  they  want  another  monarch  to  take 
his  place.  The  Crown  they  must  keep  intact  for  their  own 


23 

defence.  Suppose  the  people  attack  the  nobility.  The 
king  may  go  with  the  people  to  humble  them  if  they  be 
arrogant,  but  he  will  go  no  farther;  it  is  his  remote  inter- 
est to  preserve  them.  Suppose  the  people  attack  both 
king  and  nobility,  and  desire  to  set  up  a  new  form  of 
Government,  they  must  then  fight  both.  But  that  is 
not  all ;  before  the  Commons  of  England  can  by  force  get 
a  new  form  of  Government,  they  must  first  run  into  an- 
archy or  military  despotism ;  there  is  no  other  alternative. 
But  suppose  the  people  should  fail  in  their  attempt,  the 
nobility  would  not  consent  that  they  be  destroyed,  were 
it  possible  to  destroy  them  all,  upon  the  principle  that  if 
the  Commons  were  destroyed,  the  nobility  themselves 
would  immediately  become  the  Commons.  We  must  also 
recollect  that  the  king  has  an  army  at  his  command,  the 
nobility  officer  that  army,  and  the  Commons  fight  the 
battles. 

This  is  the  manner  in  which  the  remote  interests  are 
brought  to  bear  in  supporting  intact  each  of  the  powers 
in  England.  They  have  no  written  Constitution  in  con- 
tradistinction to  the  rules  and  laws  of  the  Parliament. 
They  have  no  Supreme  Court  to  decide  upon  the  constitu- 
tionality of  Parliamentary  acts.  The  plain  and  unequiv- 
ocal will  of  the  Parliament  has  no  check  in  the  kingdom. 
There  are  immediate  and  remote  interests,  which  are  pow- 
erful enough  throughout  the  kingdom  to  support  each  of 
the  powers  of  the  government.  These  interests,  by  the 
laws  of  human  nature,  balance  each  other,  and  sustain 
what  is  called  the  balance  of  power  in  Great  Britain. 
And  for  sustaining  the  Government,  the  English  system 
has  certainly  worked  admirably  well.  For  the  British 
Government,  however  oppressive  it  may  have  been  to  cer- 
tain classes,  has  stood  more  firmly  and  longer  than  any 
since  the  Christian  Era,  in  which  freedom  of  thought,  of 
speech  and  action,  has  been  tolerated  and  encouraged. 

Let  us  come  now  to  the  powers  of  our  own  Government 
and  consider  their  balance,  and  the  remote  interests  that 
may  be  brought  to  sustain  this  balance,  should  there  be 
a  pressure  upon  either  of  the  powers  by  the  others. 

Suppose  the  President  and  Congress  should  attempt  to 
remodel  and  limit  the  immunities  of  the  Supreme  Court 
in  such  a  manner  as  would  be  tantamount  to  their  annihi- 


24 

lation,  to  what  interests  can  the  officers  of  that  judicial 
power  in  our  country  appeal  for  the  support  of  their  im- 
munities ?  If  I  be  wrongfully  committed  to  jail,  I  have 
an  immediate  interest  in  the  power  of  the  Court,  that  it 
may  be  able  to  oppose  successfully  the  bars  of  the 
Constitution  against  the  power  that  is  oppressing 
me.  But  the  rest  of  the  citizens  have  only  a  remote  in- 
terest in  it,  which  lies  in  the  contingency  that  a  like  event 
may,  in  the  future,  come  to  themselves.  Suppose,  too, 
that  the  popular  will,  that  ungovernable  and  only  element 
in  democracies  which  governs,  be  seeking  its  immediate 
interests  through  the  President  and  Congress,  in  some 
scheme  which  they  have  in  hand.  What  then  will  become 
of  the  Supreme  Court  ?  Where  are  the  interests  to  sus- 
tain it  ?  The  people  will  do  again,  as  they  always  have 
done  heretofore,  pursue  their  immediate  interests  and  for- 
get the  remote.  Where  the  former  interests  appear  great, 
men  will  utterly  neglect  the  latter,  and  then  the  Supreme 
Court  goes  down,  or  loses  its  independence,  and  becomes 
but  the  servant  of  Congress.  And  then  intelligent  and 
patriotic  men  may  find  dungeons  throughout  the  land. 

If  legislation  cannot  destroy  the  Court,  the  President 
has  patronage,  and  Congress  has  great  facilities,  and  the 
will  of  the  majority,  too,  to  aid  them  in  disseminating 
doctrines  and  holding  illusions  before  the  people,  until 
they  gain  three-fourths  of  the  States,  and  then  down  goes 
the  Constitution  itself. 

In  the  foregoing  picture  we  have  made  prominent  the 
Supreme  Court;  we  can  just  as  easily  show  that  no  Pres- 
ident, should  he  desire  it  ever  so  much,  can  preserve  the 
immunities  of  the  Presidency,  if  they  be  attacked  by  the 
popular  will,  which  can  control  both  houses  of  Congress. 
There  is  no  power  in  the  Presidency,  nor  any  sufficiently 
potent  interests  in  the  country  to  which  the  President  can 
appeal  for  the  support  of  these  immunities.  The  Presi- 
dency and  the  Supreme  Court  are  sustained  in  our  Gov- 
ernment only  by  remote  interests,  while  the  popular  will, 
that  fundamental  and  ungovernable  element  of  govern- 
ment in  our  system,  seeks  its  immediate  interests  through 
Congress.  The  Presidency  and  the  Supreme  Court,  tho 
one  after  the  other,  will  surely  lose  their  independence 


25 

and  go  down,  unless  the  people  take  broad  and  patriotic 
views. 

In  England  there  are  three  powerful  classes  of  people, 
the  one  having  their  all  at  stake  in  the  immunities  of  the 
Crown,  another  in  the  House  of  Lords,  and  the  other  in 
the  Commons.  It  cannot  be  so  in  America  without  three 
powerful  parties,  each  one  of  which  must  support  a  dif- 
ferent power  of  our  Government.  And  in  such  case,  the 
next  President  would  be  elected  bj  the  House,  and  be  the 
popular  man  of  neither  party.  And  in  such  an  event,  the 
President  would  have  power  only  to  look  on,  and  see  the 
factions  fight  it  out  on  their  own  grounds;  unless  he 
should  be  able  to  get  an  army  of  desperate  men  to  follow 
him,  and  attempt  to  give  us  a  stroke  of  Mexican  policy. 
And  we  think  it  not  unworthy  of  observation  that  the 
President  and  Supreme  Judges  are  sworn  to  support  the 
Constitution  of  the  United  States,  for  in  our  country 
there  may  be  an  insecurity  in  this.  For  suppose  that  af- 
ter they  are  sworn  in,  the  Constitution  be  amended,  and, 
in  effect  and  in  fact,  another  Constitution  be  put  in  its 
place,  which  of  these  Constitutions  are  they  sworn  to  sup- 
port? They  are  sworn,  say  you,  to  support  that  one 
which  has  been  constitutionally  provided.  Well,  then,  if 
this  new  Constitution  contain  articles  which  will  utterly 
crush  the  civil  liberties  of  the  minority,  they  must  sus- 
tain them,  while  they  themselves  may  be  along  with  that 
minority. 

We  have  perused  the  analysis  of  the  governmental 
principles  of  our  system,  the  first  set  of  principles  spoken 
of  in  the  outset,  as  far  as  is  consistent  with  the  design  of 
this  little  pamphlet,  which  is  to  give  as  much  information 
as  possible,  but  in  as  little  space  as  possible,  and  in  so 
few  pages  that  the  pamphlet  may  be  rolled  up  and  carried 
conveniently  in  the  pocket  of  the  reader. 

And  upon  a  review  of  the  whole  of  what  has  been  set 
forth  already,  we  think  it  must  appear  that  the  balance  of 
power  in  our  Government  will  not  and  cannot  be  sus- 
tained, unless  the  balance  of  immediate  and  remote  in- 
terests be  sustained  in  the  minds  of  the  citizens  them- 
selves. We  think  that  it  must  be  apparent,  that  a  power- 
ful party,  possessing  the  entire  control  of  the  congres- 
sional halls,  and  pursuing  only  what  it  believes  to  be  its 
o 


26 

immediate  interests,  can  and  undoubtedly  will  drive 
through  the  Constitution,  and  tear  away  all  the  provisions 
contained  therein  as  safeguards  of  civil  liberty,  and  de- 
molish or  paralyze  the  powers  which  our  fathers  estab- 
lished to  defend  them.  And  we  conclude,  that  if  these 
powers  be  not  preserved,  with  independence  and  power 
to  act  in  their  full  sphere  of  action,  we  are  immediately 
launched  into  a  pure  republic,  that  whirlpool  of  passion 
that  has  provided  the  guillotine,  the  block,  the  dagger 
and  poison,  for  the  pure  and  patriotic  citizen  of  every 
country  in  which  it  has  existed;  and  upon  whose  eddies 
the  people  of  the  United  States  have  been  jostled  and 
tossed  for  the  last  few  years.  And,  we  think  it  must  be 
concluded  by  every  thinking  man,  that  to  maintain  a  bal- 
ance of  immediate  and  remote  interests  in  the  mind,  must 
require  in  some  considerable  degree  calm  reflection  and 
intellect.  Can  it  be  supposed  that  a  person  without  the 
power  of  thought,  or  who  has  never  accustomed  his  mind 
to  estimate  and  attribute  to  remote  interests  their  value, 
can  appreciate  and  act,  in  a  Government  like  ours,  and  in 
cricises  such  as  are  now  upon  us,  in  a  manner  worthy  of 
the  institutions  which  our  fathers  established,  to  secure 
the  blessings  of  civil  liberty  to  themselves  and  to  their 
posterity. 

But  we  must  now  proceed  and  look  into  the  second  set 
of  principles  mentioned  at  the  beginning,  viz :  the  princi- 
ples that  are  impelling  the  people,  and  see  if  they  be  in 
harmony  with  the  principles  of  our  Government.  For,  if 
they  are  not,  and  they  cannot  be  changed  or  impeded, 
the  destruction  of  our  institutions  is  inevitable.  And 
first,  we  may  notice,  that  Mr.  Sumner  last  February  pre- 
sented in  the  Senate  a  petition  from  a  goodly  number  of 
citizens  of  Massachusetts,  praying  for  the  abolition  of 
the  Presidency,  and  the  appointment  of  Commissioners 
from  the  Senate  to  administer  the  laws.  By  this  arrange- 
ment we  should  have  a  republic  divided  as  Rome  was, 
between  Caesar,  Pompey  and  Crassus.  It  is  not  supposed 
that  many  persons  sympathize  with  the  petitioners,  but 
the  pity  is  that  there  are  any;  and  straws  show  which  way 
the  wind  is  blowing  in  certain  sections,  and  among  cer- 
tain classes  of  people.  Do  such  persons  appreciate  the 
labors  of  our  fathers  ?  And  we  must  here  notice  that  our 


27 

republic  is  in  danger,  because  the  financial  conditions  of 
our  country  are  such,  that  though  office  holders  and  capi- 
talists are  accumulating  princely  fortunes,  the  great  ma- 
jority of  men  are  groaning  under  oppressive  burdens,  and 
"  oppression  makes  a  man  mad,"  and  renders  him  unfit  to 
act  in  a  calm  and  discreet  manner.  Just  look  at  it!  The 
people  in  the  United  States,  including  the  territories, 
have  fifty  governments  to  support.  Only  one  of  these, 
indeed,  the  General  Government,  has  an  army  and  navy. 
Leaving  the  army  and  navy  out  of  the  question,  for  the 
present,  let  some  financial  calculator,  better  skilled  in 
political  arithemetic  than  we  are,  make  the  calculatipn  for 
us,  and  let  him  give  us  the  expenses  for  one  year.  Let 
him  set  down  the  expenses  of  the  General  Government 
then  the  expenses  of  each  State  in  supporting  its  execu- 
tive, legislative  and  judicial  departments,  together  with 
penitentiaries  and  other  institutions,  then  the  expenses  of 
each  county  throughout  the  United  States,  for  jails, 
county  officials  and  other  things,  then  the  expenses  of 
each  incorporated  town  in  the  Union,  then  the  expenses 
of  each  territory,  and  then  add  up,  and  we  shall  know 
what  the  people  of  the  United  States  have  to  pay  yearly 
in  governing.  And  if  we  compare  this  sum  with  that  ex- 
pended yearly  by  England  or  France,  for  the  same  pur- 
poses, I  think  that  we  will  be  able  to  see  that  our  system 
is  the  most  expensive  of  any  on  earth.  But  to  have  full 
view  of  our  difficulties,  we  must  add  to  the  former  com- 
putation the  expenses  of  the  army  and  navy,  and  an 
enormous  national  debt,  together  with  the  facts  that  by 
the  ravages  of  war  and  the  disruption  of  society,  the 
South  has  been  rendered,  to  a  great  degree,  unproduc- 
tive, and  that  the  North  and  South  in  money  as  a  medium 
of  exchange,  are  standing  upon  an  unnatural  and  inflated 
basis.  In  view  of  all  these  things,  unless  something  is 
done  to  afford  relief  soon,  what  must  be  our  fate  ?  And 
we  may  here  ask  ourselves  a  very  humiliating  question,  if 
we  have  been  as  capable  of  self-government  as  we  were 
flattered  to  be,  how  does  it  come  that  such  enormous 
financial  difficulties  have  been  incurred  in  governing  us  ? 

•AMCKOFT  LIBRARy 

But  again,  our  Republic  is  in  danger,  because  the  safe- 
guards of  constitutional  liberty  cannot  be  sustained  if  the 
people  are  resolved  to  disregard  the  decisions  of  those 


23 

powers  whose  province  is  to  decide  certain  questions 
brought  before  them.  And  is  not  such  the  case  in  our 
country  to-day  ?  Are  not  the  decisions  of  our  Supreme 
Court  spoken  of  even  by  men  in  high  positions  as  being 
merely  partizan  measures?  And  is  it  not  dangerous  to 
our  institutions  for  men  thus  to  bring  so  important  a 
power  in  our  political  system  into  disrepute? 

But  if  it  be  really  true  that  our  Supreme  Court  has  al- 
ready lost  its  independence,  then  is  there  not  danger? 
The  highest  officer  in  onr  land  has  been  charged  with 
high  crimes  and  misdemeanors,  and  tried  and  acquitted, 
And  although  the  acquittal  can  scarcely  be  considered  a 
partisan  measure,  yet  in  the  halls  of  Congress  charges  of 
bribery  and  corruption  have  been  boldly  made.  If  the 
charges  be  true,  the  men  against  whom  they  have  been 
made  are  dangerous;  if  they  be  not  true,  the  men  who 
make  such  charges  are  dangerous. 

But  again,  our  Republic  is  in  danger,  because  it  is  only 
adapted  for  a  people  of  sound  morality,  unflinching  in- 
tegrity, high  intellectual  culture,  and  broad  patriotism. 
It  is  the  best  Government  on  earth  for  such  a  people,  but 
none  others  should  touch  it.  The  man  who  would  take 
our  system  of  Government  into  Asia  and  expect  its  suc- 
cess there,  is  simply  insane.  It  cannot  be  conducted 
successfully  among  the  Asiatics  or  the  Africans,  nor  in 
Europe  with  the  present  moral  condition  of  the  people 
there.  No  intelligent  European  dreams  that  it  can.  De 
Tocqueville  understood  our  system,  and  so  did  Miiller,  and 
so  did  Huniboldt,  and  they  wished  its  success,  that  it  might 
be  a  beacon  light,  not  to  make  the  Europeans  throw  away 
theirs  and  adopt  ours  immediately,  but  to  lead  the  people 
on  to  elevate  themselves  morally  and  intellectually,  and 
render  themselves  fit  for  a  free  government.  For  they 
well  knew  that  freedom  can  only  be  preserved  by  men 
whose  minds  are  free;  and  yet,  notwithstanding  the  les- 
sons of  history,  and  the  instruction  and  warning  of  sages, 
we  have  come  to  the  conclusion  in  America,  that  every 
man  throughout  the  world  ought  to  participate  in  our 
system  of  government.  Let  him  come  from  Asia  or  Af- 
rica, or  the  South  Sea  Islands,  he  is  certainly  a  man,  and 
therefore  ho  ought  to  be  permitted  to  participate  in  shap- 


29 

ing  our  republican  institutions.     Such  is  our  philosophy; 
is  not  such  our  madness  ? 

But  again,  our  Republic  is  in  danger  because  demoral- 
ization is  already  spreading  throughout  the  land.  The 
morality  of  the  South  is  prostrated  by  the  loss  of  hope  in 
the  white  man,  and  the  inflamed  passions  of  the  blacks,  so 
that  pure  inspirations  of  morality,  where  they  exist,  are 
smothered;  and  in  the  North,  domestic  broils,  robberies 
and  bad  faith  among  men,  is  the  order  of  the  day,  in 
those  sections  of  the  old  States  where  formerly  the  atmos- 
phere of  society  was  but  seldom  disturbed  by  the  relation 
of  a  crime,  and  where  the  vestal  fires  of  the  nation's  morality 
were  once  preserved  and  kept  burning.  These  things  are 
natural  consequences.  Civil  wars  never  mend  men's  morals. 
The  fathers  of  the  revolution  came  out  with  a  more  de- 
moralized country  than  when  they  went  into  the  strife, 
that  is  history.  To  attempt  to  mend  the  morals  of  a  fam- 
ily by  turning  husband  against  wife,  brother  against 
brother,  and  children  against  parents,  is  absurd. 

But  again,  our  Republic  is  in  danger  because  influen- 
tial leaders  of  society  do  not  seem  to  appreciate  the  insti- 
tutions which  our  fathers  established.  Who,  that  reflects, 
does  not  see  that  if  that  provision  of  our  Constitution^ 
that  Congress  shall  make  no  law  respecting  the  establish- 
ment of  religion,  were  set  aside,  it  would  be  the  bayonet 
to  the  breast  and  the  knife  to  the  throat  throughout  the 
land !  And  yet,  in  the  face  of  that,  but  last  year,  a  con- 
vention of  Protestant  clergymen  of  various  denominations 
met  at  Pittsburg,  in  Pennsylvania,  and  took  into  consid- 
eration a  resolution  avowedly  for  that  very  purpose.  Is 
it  possible  that  intelligent  men  are  so  tired  of  civil  lib- 
erty, for  our  religious  liberty  is  included  in  it,  that  they 
are  willing  even  to  think  of  wading  through  blood  to  gain 
a  theocracy;  that  old  haggard  that  maliciously  grins  at 
the  skulls  of  its  victims  ? 

But  again,  our  Republic  is  in  danger  because  the  press, 
tho  pulpit  and  the  lecture  room  have  perverted  the  doc- 
trine expressed  in  the  Declaration  of  Independence,  and 
have  taught  men  to  believe  that  all  men  are  born 
equal,  not  only  before  God,  as  his  creatures,  and  possess- 
ing tho  right  to  use  their  eyes,  and  ears,  and  hands,  and 
heads  for  their  own  benefit,  but  that  they  possess  equal 


30 

capacities  for  science  and  government;  that  in  perfect 
consistency  with  the  laws  of  nature  you  may  take  Herschel 
from  the  telescope  and  put  him  to  the  grub,  and  Sambo 
from  the  grub  to  the  telescope,  to  teach  us  the  philosophy 
of  the  stars;  a  delusion  and  a  lie,  and  the  only  effect  of 
which  is  to  place  genius  in  rags,  and  clothe  ignorance 
and  arrogance  in  scarlet  and  fine  linen.  We  are  not  in 
favor  of  enslaving  any  person  on  earth,  however  ignorant, 
much  less  are  we  in  favor  of  the  ignorant  enslaving  the 
intelligent. 

If  the  intellect  and  virtue  of  America  must  fall,  the 
Republic  will  go  with  them. 

But  again,  our  Eepublic  is  in  danger  because  the  public 
mind  is  from  day  to  day  abused  by  false  doctrines  of  loy- 
alty to  our  Government.  The  unfortunate  event  of  dis- 
loyal leaders  in  the  South  having  misled  the  people  there, 
and  made,  as  we  think,  an  unnecessary  and  cruel  war  upon 
our  institutions,  has  given  a  handle  and  cogency  to  a  fal- 
lacy, which,  perhaps,  time  only  with  its  sad  experience, 
will  be  able  to  dislodge  from  the  mind.  All  men  say 
they  who  fought  to  put  down  the  rebellion  are  loyal  men; 
the  slaves  of  the  South  did  this,  and  therefore  they  are 
loyal  men.  This  is  the  syllogism,  and  its  fallacy  forces 
itself  upon  many  an  honest  mind  as  incontrovertible  truth. 
When  Andrew  Jackson  was  besieged  near  New  Orleans 
by  the  British,  La  Fitte,  a  pirate,  was  laying  with  armed 
ships  on  the  coast  of  Texas.  He  sent  a  messenger  to 
Jackson  to  offer  his  aid  in  the  impending  conflict,  but  was 
refused.  Upon  what  principle  did  La  Fitte  desire  to 
engage  in  the  conflict  ?  Upon  the  principle  of  loyalty  to 
our  Government  ?  Not  at  all.  His  immediate  interest, 
that  he  might  make  bounty,  that  was  his  principle. 

Now  we  do  not  at  all  wish  to  make  the  negro,  who 
fought  with  us  against  the  rebellion,  to  appear  odious  by 
a  comparison  with  the  French  pirate,  but  upon  what  other 

Erinciple  did  he  fight  or  oppose  the  Confederacy?  Haf 
e  examined  the  foundations  and  superstructure  of  our 
political  edifice  and  approved  of  its  principles,  so  that  he 
was  ready  to  maintain  them  against  the  world?  If  he 
had,  in  his  situation,  it  affords  a  remarkable  instance  of 
the  triumph  of  speculative  philosophy  among  the  Africans. 
Nobody  pretends  that  he  had.  One  side  offered  him  re- 


31 

lease  from  bondage,  he  pursued  his  immediate  interest 
and  went  with  it.  We  do  not  blame  him  for  that;  he 
acted  fn  a  natural  manner.  But  does  such  an  act  make 
him  a  loyal  man  to  our  institutions  ?  Can  any  man  be 
loyal  to  our  institutions  without  a  knowledge  of  the  fun- 
damental principles  upon  which  they  are  based  ?  But 
further,  is  it  not  possible  for  the  people  of  the  United 
States  to  change  our  whole  system  of  government,  and 
that  too  in  a  constitutional  manner,  and  give  us  a  Consul 
and  Chamber  of  Deputies  instead  of  our  executive,  legis- 
lative and  judiciary? 

The  Constitution  may  at  any  time  be  changed  in  a  He- 
public  at  the  will  of  the  people,  for  that  is  the  ungovern- 
able element  of  Republics;  and  in  case  such  a  change  as 
we  have  just  spoken  of  should  be  made  in  our  country, 
who  would  be  the  loyal  men  to  our  present  Government? 
We  think  that  those  who  favored  the  change  would  be  the 
disloyalists.  We  regard  our  revolutionary  fathers  as  dis- 
loyal* to  the  British  Government,  for  they  forsook  the 
fundamental  principles  of  that  Government  when  they 
sought  after  republican  institutions.  And  we  must  ob- 
serve that  a  change  of  rulers  is  not  a  change  of  Govern- 
ment. An  absolute  monarch  may  be  killed  and  another 
monarch  take  his  place,  without  any  change  whatever  in 
the  governmental  principles.  And  we  must  observe  fur- 
ther, that  in  constitutional  governments,  many  changes 
in  the  Constitution  may  be  made  without  aftecting  the 
fundamental  principles,  and  consequently,  often  without 
danger.  But  remove  one  of  the  fundamental  principles, 
and  the  government  will  totter,  and  unless  it  be  restored, 
will  eventually  fall.  And  the  man  who  does  not  under- 
stand and  appreciate  these  fundamental  principles,  cannot 
be  loyal  to  the  Government.  And  this  we  believe  to  be 
the  conditions  of  the  blacks  of  the  South  to-day,  and, 
therefore,  we  regard  the  African  element  which  has  now 
been  introduced  by  the  present  Congress,  and  that,  too, 
most  probably  against  the  will  of  the  majority  of  the  peo- 
ple of  the  United  States,  to  say  nothing  about  constitu- 
tional questions,  (and  which  action  in  itself  in  such  man- 
ner, on  the  part  of  Congress,  is  a  source  of  danger, )  to  be 
a  most  dangerous  element  to  our  civil  liberties.  To  ad- 
mit a  people  who  were  formerly  excluded,  to  participate 


32 

in  the  Government,  to  be  sure,  is  not  a  change  of  the 
fundamental  principles  of  the  Government  itself,  but  it  is 
a  change  of  the  conditions  upon  which  the  governmental 
principles  must  depend  for  their  success.  The  Africans 
of  the  South  can  no  doubt  make  constitutions  and  laws, 
upon  the  same  principle  that  men  make  grammars,  com- 
pile them  from  the  works  of  others ;  but  after  they  are 
compiled,  to  make  their  application  in  harmony  with  the 
principles  of  justice  and  liberty,  is  a  very  different  thing. 
The  African  element  cannot  be  loyal  to  civil  liberty  and 
to  the  institutions  which  our  fathers  established  to  secure 
it.  There  is  not  a  loyal  Chinaman  in  our  land.  To  main- 
tain civil  liberty  in  a  constitutional  republic,  requires  the 
greatest  elevation  of  mind  and  character  that  the  white 
man  has  ever  attained.  Can  the  African  and  Asiatic, 
under  the  most  favorable  circumstances,  attain  and  stand 
upon  such  an  elevation  ?  Unfortunately,  the  white  man 
heretofore  has  never  been  able  to  stand  there  long,  and 
his  civil  liberty  we  regard  as  too  precious  and  rare  a  boon 
to  be  risked  in  an  experiment  with  the  Africans  and 
Asiatics. 

But  again,  our  Eepublic  is  in  danger  because,  should 
the  freedom  of  the  press  and  speech  continue  (and  with- 
out it  liberty  is  gone),  America  will,  in  a  very  few  years, 
become  the  great  arena  in  which  all  the  opinions  and  isms 
of  the  world  will  meet  in  deadly  conflict.  This  has  always 
been  the  case  in  Republics  heretofore,  and  whatever  po- 
litical advantage  may  be  gained,  will  be  grasped  at  by 
each  set  of  men,  and  the  pressure  of  all  this  Babel  will 
be  in  Congress,  which  may  be  as  impassioned  a  body  of 
men  as  once  surrounded  the  Acropolis  of  Athens,  and 
which  can  be  managed  only  by  bold  and  unscrupulous 
manipulators,  as  is  the  case  to  a  great  degree  already. 
And  in  the  view  of  such  certain  events  already  upon  us, 
instead  of  sustaining  the  immunities  of  the  Presidency 
and  of  the  Supreme  Court,  and  making  them  efficient 
powers,  and  a  just  balance  in  our  country,  and  firmly  an- 
choring them  so  that  they  will  not  drag  their  anchors 
when  pressed  by  the  storm,  and  filling  them  with  men 
who  are  not  time-serving  politicians,  with  Platonic  Re- 
publics in  their  heads,  but  honest  lovers  of  civil  liberty; 
the  people  are  supporting  men  in  Congress  now,  who  are 


33 

nightly  conjuring  how  to  overthrow  the  immunities  of 
these  powers  and  balance  of  our  Government,  and  invit- 
ing like  Juno,  ^olus  to  roll  away  the  stone  from  the  cave, 
and  let  the  winds  sweep  and  rend  the  Republic  into 
fragments. 


